







A good deal of criticism is aimed at the United States for extraterritorial
assertions ofjurisdiction. However, the United States is not the only country
to assert and exercise jurisdiction over conduct occurring outside its territory.
A number of other nations do so.
Competition laws provide the clearest example. The Federal Republic of
Germany's competition law reaches extraterritorial conduct with effects in its
territory. The competition law of the European Community similarly reaches
extraterritorially. The competition laws of a number of other jurisdictions
assert extraterritorial reach, although the practice under these laws is not
extensive.'
Economic sanctions are another example. The Arab nations' boycott of
Israel imposes sanctions on foreign companies for economic activity outside
the boycotting countries. Several countries have extended their sanctions
against South Africa to reach the foreign activities of non-national
companies. 2
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1. See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS
PRACTICES OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (1977) (identifies Austria, Denmark, Spain, France,
Sweden, and Finland as also asserting extraterritorial reach). See also LOWE, EXTRATERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION 63 (1983); REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE COMMITTEE ON
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF NATIONAL LAWS (Sept. 16, 1986) (Document No. 225-4/11). The
new Canadian Competition Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. 26 (1986), clearly contemplates extraterritorial
reach in enforcement. Section 9(2) provides: "Where the person against whom an order is sought
... in relation to an inquiry is a corporation and . . .an affiliate, whether the affiliate is located in
Canada or outside Canada, has records that are relevant to the inquiry, the judge may order the
corporation to produce the records." A foreign blocking action may provide a defense under Section
42 of the Act which provides: "Every person who, without good and sufficient cause, the proof of
which lies on him, fails to comply with an order made under section 9 ... is guilty of an offence .. "
2. E.g., the Swedish Act on the Prohibition of Investments in South Africa and Namibia
(entered into force on Apr. 1, 1985) and the Danish law on the subject (adopted on May 29, 1985).
These statutes bar not only the investments of domestic legal persons, but also require them to
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Even the United Kingdom has asserted extraterritorial jurisdiction over
non-nationals. For example, under the Protection of Trading Interests Act of
1980, the United Kingdom asserts the right to control the activities of persons
outside the United Kingdom when her trade interests are threatened by any
foreign State's trade measures which would apply extraterritorially. The
statute does not require, as a precondition, that the other state's exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction be unlawful .
While the United States is not alone in asserting extraterritorial
jurisdiction, it is the most prolific source of extraterritorial law, regulation,
and enforcement action. Not surprisingly, it is the most significant target of
international complaint about extraterritoriality. This article briefly reviews
the range of extraterritoriality conflict, the basic U.S. thesis in the legal
debate, its management framework for these problems, and some of the
recent U.S. practice.
II
THE BROAD RANGE OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY CONFLICT
Conflict over extraterritorial jurisdiction has occurred in a variety of areas
in recent years: antitrust, export controls, and law enforcement. There have
been problems in antitrust since Learned Hand's Alcoa decision enunciated
the "effects test" in 1945. 4 The most celebrated case generating foreign
relations problems was the oil cartel investigation by the Justice Department
in the 1940's and early 1950's which raised such intense international
concerns that, for national security reasons, Presidents Truman and
Eisenhower required the Justice Department to proceed civilly rather than
criminally. 5 More recently, foreign governments have objected to such
exercise their control over subsidiaries to avoid such investments. The Swedish Government
rejected criticism that this was an unlawful exercise of jurisdiction in the territory of another state:
What is demanded by Sweden is that a Swedish group management, in exercising its possibilities
to issue directives to a Swedish-owned or Swedish-dominated subsidiary, shall follow the rules of
Swedish law. In the event of collisions of law, however, the basic principle, according to
international law, must be not to coerce one's own legal subjects, when they are under the
territorial jurisdiction of a foreign state, to actions incompatible with the legal system of that
state.
Statement of Minister in Government Bill 29 (1985) (copy on file with author).
3. See infra note 9, in which U.S. jurisdiction was found lawful by the House of Lords in the
Laker Airways antitrust action. Cf. P.T.I.A., Order and General Directors (June 27, 1983) (barring
production of evidence located in the United Kingdom, the United States, and third countries, by
both U.K. and third-country companies present and doing business in the United States); Rules of
the Supreme Court, Order 24, rules 3, 11 (English discovery rules requiring a party to produce
documents in its possession outside the United Kingdom).
4. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1945). Even English
jurisprudence may not be entirely hostile to "effects" based criminal jurisdiction, at least where the
criminal rule is not inimical to state policy where the conduct occurred. See Treacey v. Director of
Public Prosecutions, 1971 App. Cas. 537, 561, 1 All E. R. 110, 121 (Diplock, L.) (indicating in dictum
that, taking into account comity requirements, territoriality can be judged either by the place where
the physical acts were committed or where the results were obtained). But see Regina v. Markus, 1976
App. Cas. 35.
5. See 1J. ATWOOO & K. BREwsTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD § 2.24 (2d ed.
1981).
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inquiries as the North Atlantic shipping investigation 6 and the North Atlantic
aviation investigation (the latter terminated by President Reagan for foreign
policy reasons). 7 Serious concerns have also been expressed over such
private proceedings as the uranium cartel cases8 and the recent suit by the
bankrupt Laker Airways alleging predation by its former competitors. 9
Problems began to arise in the area of trade and economic embargoes as
U.S. policies diverged from those of its trading partners on such issues as the
proper treatment of China and the threat posed by Castro's Cuba.' 0 The
difficulties took new direction and characteristics when the petrodollar
explosion enlarged the impact of the Arab boycott'' and foreign bribery
practices, 12 as the United States responded with legislation having some reach
to conduct abroad of companies not incorporated in the United States. Today
a major problem is to strike a proper balance between, on the one hand,
economic competition and the free flow of technology among the Western
countries and, on the other, the need to limit military benefits derived by the
Soviet Union. ' 3
For the present Administration, extraterritoriality became an acute
problem when, in June 1982, it broadened sanctions imposed six months
earlier against the Soviet natural gas pipeline. 14 Promulgated under a 1977
amendment of the Export Administration Act by which Congress intentionally
granted broad extraterritorial authority, 15 the newly broadened regulations
6. Id. § 3.26.
7. See Hershey, Reagan Orders an End To Air Travel Inquiry, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1984, at D 1, col.
4.
8. In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Il. 1979).
9. Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 559 F. Supp. 1124 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd sub
nom. Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984). See also
British Airways Board v. Laker Airways, Ltd., 3 W.L.R. 544 (1983), aff'd in part 1985 A.C. 58. See
generallyJ. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 5, § 6.16.
10. Multilateral cooperation in Chinese controls began to break down after the Korean War.
Serious strains arose with Canada in 1957, when a Ford (Canada) sale of 1000 trucks to China was
blocked by a U.S. order to Ford (U.S.). A similar 1964 order to Freuhof (U.S.) regarding sale of
semi-trailers by Freuhof (France) to Berliet (France), destined for China, led to the French court
appointing a temporary administrator for Freuhof (France). Societe Freuhof v. Massardy (Ct. of
App. Paris, May 22, 1965), reprinted in 5 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 476 (1966). See generally G. HUFBAUER
&J. ScnoTr & K. ELLIOT. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED: HISTORY AND CURRENT POLICY 221-
30, 315-23 (1985).
11. Export Administration Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1629
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 2407 (1982)).
12. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, -2 (1982)).
13. See, e.g., NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE, U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY EXPORT CONTROLS AND
GLOBAL ECONOMIC COMPETITION (1987).
14. Prior to December 1981, the United States had foreign policy controls on exports to the
Soviet Union of both oil and gas exploration and production equipment, and also technical data.
Citing the Soviet Union's direct responsibility for repression in Poland, the United States expanded
these controls in December 1981 to cover exports for the transmission or refinement of petroleum or
natural gas and announced that outstanding licenses and re-export authorizations were subject to
review. See 47 Fed. Reg. 141 (1982) (amending 15 C.F.R. §§ 379, 385, 399).
15. Export Administration Act Amendments of 1977, supra note 11, providing authority under
§ 4(b)(l) of the Export Administration Act of 1969 to prohibit or curtail exports of goods and
technical data regardless of origin "exported by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States." The legislative history stated that this amendment was intended:
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applied, by their terms, to exports from other countries of non-U.S. origin
goods and technical data by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies as well as
to exports even by entirely foreign companies of commodities produced
abroad under licensing agreement with the U.S. firms. The regulations also
purported to override existing contracts.' 6
While the pipeline sanctions were particularly criticized for asserting
jurisdiction over foreign corporations based on U.S. nationality of the parent
company, it is doubtful that any of the cases which actually arose under those
controls was a pure foreign subsidiary control involving no U.S.-origin goods
or technology. In the most prominent case, the French subsidiary of Dresser
Industries of Dallas, Texas was denied certain U.S. export privileges for
violating the pipeline controls by shipping natural gas equipment produced in
France to the Soviet Union. The case was not, however, predicated solely on
the status of Dresser (France) as a subsidiary of a U.S. firm: The manufacture
in question involved technology licensed to Dresser (France) by its U.S.
parent. 17 Nonetheless, these controls produced harsh criticism, intense levels
of diplomatic controversy, and a Netherlands court judgment characterizing
the United States control of exports from the Netherlands to the Soviet Union
as a violation of international law.' 8 The Administration eventually resolved
that crisis diplomatically, terminating the sanctions in November 1982,19 on
the basis that it had achieved some improved Western understanding on East-
West trade. 20
Despite strong foreign government comment during the protracted
consideration of Export Administration Act Renewal during 1983-1985,2 1
Congress preserved the extraterritorial reach of that law. Thus, the potential
for controversial extraterritorial regulation remains and so does the concern
of the United States' trading partners.
to provide authority for control over exports of non U.S. origin goods and technology by foreign
subsidiaries of U.S. concerns. This is in addition to the authority currently provided in the
Export Administration Act for control over the export of U.S. origin goods and technology,
whether from the United States or abroad.
H.R. REP. No. 459, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1977). Despite widespread criticism, this authority has
survived two major revisions of the Export Administration Act in 1979 and 1985.
16. 47 Fed. Reg. 17,250 (1982) (amending 15 C.F.R. §§ 376, 379, 385).
17. See Note, Dresser Industries: The Failnre of Foreign Policy Trade Controls wnder the Export
Administration Act, 8 MD.J. INT'L L. & TRADE 122 (1984).
18. Companie Europeenne des Petroles v. Sensor Nederland No. 82/716 (Dist. Ct. The Hague.
Sept. 17, 1982), reprinted in 22 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 66 (1983).
19. 47 Fed. Reg. 51858 (1982) (amending 15 C.F.R. §§ 379, 385, 390, 399).
20. See K. Dam, Economic and Political Aspects of Extrateritorialit, Address by Deputy Secretary of
State to the Committee on International Aspects of Antitrust Law of the International Section of the
American Bar Association (Apr. 16, 1985), reprinted in 19 INT'L LAW. 887 (1985).
21. For instance, the European Community called the extraterritorial aspects of the Export
Administration Act "unacceptable" and "contrary to international law" and stated that "it may be
necessary to consider means by which the effects on persons doing business in the Community of the
extraterritorial application of U.S. export controls might be countered." Aide-Memoire, Delegation
of the Commission of the European Communities (Mar. 14, 1975), reprinted in Extension and Revision of
the Export Administration Act of 1979. Hearings on H.R. 3231 Before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1856 (1983). Similar views were expressed by Germany, France, the United
Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. Id. at 1865-99.
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There have been difficulties over the extraterritorial application of U.S.
law and regulation in a variety of other areas in recent years. Diplomatic as
well as courtroom clashes have occurred over foreign evidence production in
cases such as Marc Rich (tax fraud),22 St. Jo (insider trading) 23 and Bank of Nova
Scotia (narcotics investigations).24 In the area of international merger
regulation, the United States has on occasion been accused of using a small
U.S. tail to wag a foreign merger dog. Finally, use of the worldwide unitary
tax method by California and some other U.S. states has been persistently
challenged by U.S. trading partners as an improper tax on extraterritorial
values, incompatible with the multinational enterprise system.25
III
THE UNDERLYING NEEDS ARE LIKELY TO REMAIN
In the continuing international extraterritoriality debate, suggestions have
often been made by foreign officials and both American and foreign
commentators that the United States should abandon the extraterritorial
reach of certain laws and limit itself in offshore investigations and evidence
gathering to the channels other states have traditionally utilized. Sometimes
this has been urged on policy grounds. Often, it has been urged as well that
proper application of existing international law principles and rules would
avoid most of the current extraterritoriality conflicts. U.S. officials have been
unable to accept these suggestions, since conflict has occurred mostly in areas
in which the government believes action is required by compelling underlying
interests.
For example, it has occurred regarding investigations into offshore money
laundering, a common adjunct to both domestic and transnational
racketeering. Getting at the money laundering is an important tool for
prosecuting the criminal enterprise. It is difficult to get at it without reaching
outside U.S. borders. 26
22. In re Marc Rich & Co., 736 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1984).
23. SEC v. Banca della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
24. United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384 (11 th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S.
1119 (1983); United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 722 F.2d 657 (1 1th Cir. 1983), 740 F.2d 817 (1 1th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985).
25. See, e.g., Brief for the Government of Canada, the Government of the United Kingdom, and
the Member States of the European Communities and the Governments of Australia, Japan, and
Switzerland, Alcan Aluminum, Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd., No. 84-C-6932 (N.D. Ill. 1984). The
problem has moved toward a practical solution. See infra p. 299 & note 80.
26. Pursuant to the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1352(a), 100
Stat. 3207-18 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956 (West Supp. 1987)) U.S. law now prohibits money
laundering when the conduct is (i) by a U.S. citizen or (ii) by a non-U.S. citizen and occurs in part in
the United States. The offense requires an intent to facilitate "specified" unlawful activity or
knowledge that the transaction is to conceal the fact that the proceeds come from such activity. Some
foreign concern has been expressed that only marginal conduct "in the United States" will be
regarded as sufficient for the exercise of jurisdiction and that non-racketeering transactions will be
included since violations of the Export Administration Act, Arms Export Control Act, International
Emergencies Economic Powers Act, and Trading with the Enemy Act are listed as "specified"
unlawful activity. However, the United States has informed OECD members that "[t]he Department
of Justice is requiring approval by the head of the Criminal Division .. .in Washington before the
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The securities markets, to take another example, now function in an
internationalized trading environment. The "level playing field" American
law is intended to foster cannot be maintained if the foreign located player, or
a domestic player channelling his activity through a foreign agent, enjoys a
tactical high ground, out of reach of rules and referees. 27
In the competition area, U.S. law is not likely to be limited to the
decreasing portion of commerce which is purely domestic and conflicts are
likely to arise as long as competition laws and policies differ among nations.
Unilateral U.S. restraint may not always be desirable. For example, when the
U.K. carrier Laker Airways brought a private antitrust action in the United
States against British and other carriers in North Atlantic Aviation alleging
secret price fixing and the United States opened a grand jury investigation of
North Atlantic Aviation, the United Kingdom argued that one nation's law
and policy may be applied to bilateral aviation (or other bilateral commerce)
only to the extent of bilateral agreement. That superficially attractive U.K.
formula, however, was a demand that laissez-faire U.K. law apply
automatically. The U.S. competition authorities did not consider that the
United States should, as a matter of comity, subject American consumers to
such practices or legal policies. Nor did the United States approve when the
United Kingdom tried to block companies present and doing business in the
United States from producing evidence (located here and elsewhere) for the
U.S. legal proceedings. 28
National security trade controls provide another example. The conditions
causing the United States to want to deny strategically important goods and
critical technologies to the Soviet block are likely to continue. For effective
denial, the United States cannot be indifferent to what happens to U.S. origin
goods and technology after they depart U.S. territory for an authorized
destination. For this reason, the United States proscribes and sanctions
diversions of those goods and technology to unauthorized foreign
destinations. 29 There is, however, a broad western commitment to and
cooperation in strategic denial which not only makes these controls more
effective than unilateral ones would be, but also minimizes their potential for
generating extraterritoriality problems.
Foreign policy export and re-export controls are also likely to continue to
be used to some degree. It is questionable whether unilateral foreign policy
controls remain affordable, even without extraterritorial reach, given the
adverse impact on U.S. competitiveness abroad and the scant evidence that
extraterritorial provisions can be enforced. Such approval is not likely for laundering the proceeds
of any of the four above-referenced violations." Unclassified State Department telegram (Dec. 3,
1986) (on file with Office of Legal Adviser).
27. See Crime and Secrec,: The Use of Offshore Banks and Companies: Hearings Before the Permanent
Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 134-46, 318-
48 (May 24, 1983) (testimony ofJohn M. Fedders, Director, SEC Division of Enforcement).
28. See supra p. 284 & ina note 33.
29. See, e.g., 15 C.F.R. §§ 374.1, 387.4, 387.6 (1987) (provisions and penalties applicable to
unauthorized transfers abroad of national security controlled items).
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unilateral economic sanctions are effective.30 However, U.S. policy makers
give no signs of abandoning the felt need for foreign policy controls as an
important symbolic nonmilitary option when diplomatic protest is
inadequate.3' By contrast with national security controls, foreign policy
controls have tended to be unilateral since other major trading countries do
not generally undertake economic sanctions. This gives foreign policy
controls more potential than national security controls for creating
extraterritoriality conflicts. The United States Government presently appears
sufficiently concerned with the costs that extraterritoriality adds to unilateral
economic sanctions to accept the alternative of reduced scope in adopting
new sanctions under the International Emergencies Economic Powers Act.
However, this concern has not eliminated all re-export aspects of foreign
policy controls; some re-export reach has been included when the
government has expanded Export Administration Act controls against
countries like South Africa3 2 and Syria.33
Given the increasingly transnational nature of modern day activity, U.S.
agencies will not be able to limit their activities to U.S. territory. They
recognize that their agents and employees may not physically operate within
another state's territory without its consent. 34 They also recognize that they
need the cooperation or acquiescence of foreign jurisdictions in order to
conduct effective investigation and evidence gathering abroad. But, absent
viable cooperative channels, they reserve the right to take unilateral measures,
such as demands that persons subject to the in personam jurisdiction of U.S.
courts provide evidence from wherever located.3 5
30. See, e.g., G. HUFBAUER, J. SCHOTT & K. ELLIOT, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED:
HISTORY AND CURRENT POLICY (1985).
31. See, e.g., Address by Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Adviser, Department of State, Washington
Foreign Law Society (Feb. 2, 1986) (on file with the Office of the Legal Adviser). The extensive
foreign policy export controls currently in place under the Export Administration Regulations
include regional stability, human rights, anti-terrorism, Libya, chemical weapons materials to Iran,
Iraq, and Syria, countries embargoed under the Trading with the Enemy Act (North Korea, Vietnam,
Cambodia, and Cuba), Soviet Union and Afghanistan, South Africa and Namibia, and nuclear non-
proliferation. 15 C.F.R. §§ 368-99 (1981). See also Department of Commerce, Report to Congress
(Jan. 11, 1987). In addition to these and the corresponding North Korean, Vietnamese, Cambodian,
and Cuban controls administered by the Treasury Department under the Trading With the Enemy
Act, there are economic sanctions with export and/or re-export features in effect under the
International Emergencies Economic Powers Act as it applies to Libya, Nicaragua, and South Africa.
31 C.F.R. §§ 500-50 (1986).
32. See Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, § 304, 100 Stat. 1086,
1099 (codified at 22 U.S.C.A. § 5054 (West Supp. 1985)).
33. See, e.g., 15 C.F.R. § 385.4(d) (1987).
34. United States investigative agencies routinely obtain permission from foreign governments
before conducting investigations on the territories of those governments. In certain instances,
permission has been granted in agreements covering a range of activities of a particular agency. All
non-military activities of U.S. agencies in a foreign country are under the general foreign affairs
oversight of the United States Ambassador pursuant to the Foreign Service Act of 1980, 22 U.S.C.
§ 3921 (1982).
35. See cases cited supra notes 22-24. This view has even led U.S. agencies to intercede in private
cases against blanket requirements to use international instruments such as the Hague Evidence
Convention instead of unilateral U.S. process for obtaining evidence from abroad. See, e.g., Brief for
the United States and the Securities and Exchange Commission as amici curiae, Societe Nationale
Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Ct., No. 85-1695 (S. Ct. Oct. Term 1986).
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THE APPROACH OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT
Within the United States Government, the seriousness of the problem of
conflicting assertions of jurisdiction has become more widely appreciated
than it was in past decades. The State Department has placed more emphasis
than other agencies on the need to manage this problem effectively. The
Department has stressed the vital importance of the sovereignty and interests
of the foreign countries affected by extraterritorial assertions of U.S. law. It
has also emphasized that, over the long run, cooperation with foreign
countries best serves the interests of the United States in dealing with
transnational problems.
Secretary Shultz has called attention to the fact that extraterritoriality
conflicts have a number of seriously damaging results: (i) diplomatic conflict
damaging to U.S. efforts to achieve important national and security objectives;
(ii) foreign blocking legislation and frustration of U.S. regulatory and law
enforcement interests; (iii) foreign resistance to U.S. investment in activities
likely to be subject to U.S. extraterritorial controls, such as high-tech
manufacture; (iv) damage to a cherished U.S. foreign investment principle,
national treatment, as some foreign states argue that U.S. insistence on
treating foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies as subject to U.S. jurisdiction
undermines their claim to national treatment; and (v) efforts by foreign
manufacturers to seek non-U.S. sources of supply.3 6
In the wake of the pipeline crisis, Secretary Shultz stated that it was
imperative to manage extraterritoriality, since disputes over it could become a
bigger threat to U.S. economic interests than concerns about tariffs, quotas,
and exchange rates, and they could poison political cooperation among the
democracies.3 7
The State Department has, in fact, been actively working since 1981 to
improve Executive Branch management of the growing extraterritoriality
problems. In 1983, the Department publicly recommended the following
agenda: (i) seek to resolve the policy differences that underlie many of the
conflicts; (ii) develop appropriate guidelines for assertions of authority over
conduct abroad (such as an interest balancing or comity approach);
(iii) expand the practice, pioneered in the antitrust area, of notice,
consultation, and cooperation with foreign governments where contemplated
actions raise a danger of conflicts; (iv) expand international cooperative
arrangements; and (v) increase opportunities for advance consultation by the
Department of State on U.S. regulatory or enforcement actions that
substantially involve other countries' interests.3 8
36. G. Shultz, Trade, Interdependence, and Conflicts ofJurisdiction, Address by the Secretary of State
to the South Carolina Bar Association (May 5, 1984).
37. Id.
38. See Dam, Extraterritoriality and Conflicts ofJurisdiction, 1983 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 370.
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V
THE THEORETICAL DEBATE
At the time this agenda was being articulated, Canada and the United
Kingdom were each trying to address the extraterritoriality issue bilaterally
with the United States on a substantially more theoretical plane. United
Kingdom representatives tended to frame the issue in terms of a limited and
exhaustive list of internationally permissible bases of jurisdiction of which
territoriality was preferred. The Canadian approach was similar but
somewhat more flexible on the scope of the categories. U.S. spokesmen
rejected and continue to reject that view. They maintain that concurrent
jurisdiction is an increasingly frequent fact of life and that comity, rather than
rigid legal rules, will be necessary to manage and mitigate the conflicts.
Comity, in this context, is a principle pursuant to which a nation exercises its
jurisdiction with an eye toward overall reasonableness in the multinational
system. As defined by long-standing precedent, it is between pure discretion
and hard law,39 a guide to practice from which legal rules may arise.
An analogous debate occurred regarding the proposed American Law
Institute Restatement (Revised): Foreign Relations Law of the United States.
The proposed basic jurisdictional provisions (sections 402 and 403) set out an
exhaustive list of permitted categories of jurisdiction and subjected the
lawfulness of jurisdiction within those categories to an overriding test of
reasonableness. Reasonableness was to be determined by weighing a number
of factors and, in case ofjurisdictional conflict, jurisdiction would lie only with
the state with the greater interest.
The State Department Legal Adviser said that the approach proposed to
be taken by the Restatement (Revised) was unsound as a matter of existing
positive law and undesirable as a legal policy objective; it did not provide a
viable framework for the policy choices in the varied and changing
circumstances governments face.a0 The search for an exhaustive list of
permissible jurisdictional bases runs counter to the reality that jurisdictional
practices are necessarily evolutionary. "States, increasingly, attach legal
consequences to conduct or events outside their territory involving persons
not of their own nationality. They do so, for example, under such legal
constructs as 'objective territoriality' or the 'effects doctrine,' or under such
theories as 'enterprise unity.' "41 Moreover, the concept that extraterritorial
39. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
40. See, e.g., D. Robinson, Legal Adviser to the Department of State, Conference on
Extraterritoriality for the Businessman and the Practicing Lawyer (June 7, 1983), reprinted at 15 LAw
& POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1147 (1983) (conference sponsored jointly by the Int'l Section of the Dist. of
Columbia Bar, the Georgetown Univ. Law Center, and Law & Policy in Int'l Business); Conflicting
Assertions of National Jurisdiction over Multinational Enterprises 22-29 (1983) (proceedings of the
1983 Conference of the Canadian Council on Int'l Law) (on file with author); Reflections on the Current
State of "Extraterritoriality" (Nov. 2, 1984) (before the Int'l Law Association) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Reflections]; Letter from Davis R. Robinson to R. Ami Cutter (Feb. 6, 1985) (on file with
the Office of the Asst. Legal Advisor for Economic, Business and Communications) [hereinafter
Letter].
41. Reflections, supra note 40.
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jurisdiction is permitted only on the basis of an exhaustive list of affirmatively
recognized links "[stood] the international law principle ofjurisdiction, stated
unmistakably in the Lotus opinion, on its head."-42 The Lotus opinion is based
on the proposition that states are left a wide measure of discretion in the
assertion of jurisdiction, limited only by established prohibitive rules. 43
The Legal Adviser was particularly critical of the proposal that a legal rule
of reason identify the jurisdiction with the greater interest as the single lawful
jurisdiction in conflict situations. This was seen as an unworkable "winner
take all" rule, which had the potential for exacerbating conflicts.
A nation should not be put in jeopardy of violating international law because its good
faith judgments in such a difficult area as interest balancing might later turn out to be
different from those which a third party arbiter might reach. A rule that encourages
international legal second-guessing is not conducive to effective international
cooperation. It would be difficult to obtain deference to foreign interests from
domestic regulators, enforcers or judges if such deference were to be viewed not as
self-restraint in furtherance of comity, but as a precedent evidencing primacy of
foreign interests as a matter of law.
4 4
U.S. government spokesmen identified only one firmly established
international law limit-a threshold requirement that a state have a sufficient
nexus with the matter to justify an assertion of jurisdiction. 45 The traditional
categories of jurisdiction (territoriality, nationality, protective principle, and
universality) were seen as the principal kinds of nexus generally considered
sufficient, but the sufficiency or basic reasonableness of other kinds of
connections for certain exercises of jurisdiction could not be excluded a
priori.46 Ownership and control of a corporation and jurisdiction based on
the origin of goods or technology were given as examples of other real ties
which support limited exercises of jurisdiction.
In this debate, the State Department did not argue that there should be
anarchy in jurisdictional matters above the "sufficient nexus" threshold. It
recognized the need for some principles to deal with the broad areas of
potential conflict in such an extensively "concurrent" jurisdictional universe.
However, it did not find that much had crystallized in the way of binding legal
constraints beyond the general need to avoid interference with the territorial
sovereign in certain predominantly domestic situations, such as local labor
regulation. 4 7 The Department argued that, beyond those limits, which
42. Letter, supra note 40.
43. France v. Turkey, 1927 P.C.IJ. (Ser. A) No. 10, at 19 (the S.S. Lotus case).
44. Reflections, supra note 40.
45. Letter, supra note 40. See also 2 D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAw 658 (1965) (The test of
whether the application of municipal law extraterritorially conforms with international law is
"whether the event, act or person to which or to whom it applies bears upon the peace, order and
good government of the acting or legislating state.").
46. Letter, supra note 40.
47. Id. In 1984, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 was made applicable to U.S.
corporations overseas, but only to the extent that it does not conflict with the law of the foreign
workplace. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1982), as amended by Older Americans Act Amendments of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-459, § 802(b)(1), 98 Stat. 1767, 1792 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1982 & Supp.
III 1985)). However, the United States recently legislated the Sullivan Principles to govern the labor
practices of U.S. companies in South Africa. Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L.
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constitute a kind of threshold reasonableness requirement, good sense and
principles of comity, rather than hard and fast legal rules, come into play to
avoid, mitigate, and manage the potential conflicts of jurisdiction. 48
In the context of the debate over the proposed Restatement (Revised), the
Office of the Legal Adviser asked that section 402, dealing with jurisdiction to
prescribe, be made more open ended and that section 403 be converted back
to a principle of comity. These concerns were partly accommodated. The
commentary to section 402 has been amended to be more open to additional
bases for some limited jurisdiction 49 and, while the process of balancing
interests in cases of conflict remains mandatory in section 403, the
requirement to defer to the state with the greater interest has been relaxed. 50
VI
THE OECD AND EXECUTIVE BRANCH CONSENSUS
The early bilateral diplomatic legal debates were followed by both bilateral
and multilateral efforts to engage the United States in drawing up some non-
binding statements of jurisdictional principle. The common element of such
efforts was to identify the legally "more appropriate" jurisdiction, generally
on the basis of territorial priority. The U.S. participants were prepared to
acknowledge informally the importance of sovereignty over territory as a
theoretical, political, and practical matter. They were not, however, prepared
to sign on to the proposition that the territorial interest would, in case of
conflict, generally take precedence as a matter of law or policy. These efforts
produced a document, endorsed by the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) ministers in May, 1984, 5 1 which still
defines the extent of international consensus on extraterritoriality theory,
principle, and conflict management.
No. 99-440, §§ 207-208, 100 Stat. 1086, 1097-98 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 5034-35 (West Supp.
1987)). To the extent this exceeds the limits of normally permissible jurisdiction, it may be justified
by the fact that it responds to violations of internationally recognized human rights duties owed by
South Africa erga omnes.
48. Reflections, supra note 40.
49. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (Tent. Final
Draft, 1986) (unpublished). Earlier drafts of comment (a) to section 402 described the section's
categories as "necessary." See e.g., RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 402 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981). As finally approved, comment (a) expressly states
that "other links may also be sufficient to support jurisdiction in limited circumstances."
RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATION LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(a) (Tent. Final
Draft, 1986) (unpublished).
50. Drafts of section 403(3) would have required the state with the lesser interest to defer to the
state with the greater interest. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 403(3) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981). As finally approved, the section requires
consideration of the interests of both states, but provides that a state "should defer to the other state
if that state's interest is clearly greater." (emphasis added) Id. § 403(3). Thus, for conflict cases,
section 403(3) returned to the Restatement (Second) notion of comity. However, the addition of
"clearly" introduced a margin of error into the test, which became inappropriate once section 403(3)
ceased to assert a binding rule.
51. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 23-34 (1984).
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Part (a) of this document, entitled "General Considerations" states that
members contemplating exercises ofjurisdiction "which may conflict with the
legal requirements or established policies of another member and lead to
conflicting requirements being imposed upon multinational enterprises"
should:
i) Have regard to relevant principles of international law;
ii) Endeavor to avoid or minimize such conflicts and the problems to which they give
rise by following an approach of moderation and restraint 5 2 respecting and
accommodating the interests of other member countries;
iii) Take fully into account the sovereignty and legitimate economic, law
enforcement and other interests of other Member countries;
iv) Bear in mind the importance of permitting the observance of contractual
obligations and the possible adverse impact of measures having a retroactive effect.
Member countries should endeavor to promote cooperation as an alternative to
unilateral action to avoid or minimize conflicting requirements and problems arising
therefrom. Member countries should on request consult one another and endeavor to
arrive at mutually acceptable solutions to such problems. 5 3
Part (b) of the document, entitled "Practical Approaches," deals with
formal and informal arrangements for notice and consultation, primarily on a
bilateral basis, regarding potential conflicting requirements. It calls for early
notice to other member countries of proposed "new legislation or regulations
which have significant potential for conflict with the legal requirements or
established policies of other Member countries and for giving rise to
conflicting requirements being imposed on multinational enterprises."
Finally, it calls upon members to "[g]ive prompt and full consideration to
proposals which may be made ... that would lessen or eliminate conflicts." 54
This OECD consensus was unavoidably vague and ambiguous, in light of
the disagreement among the participants on the content of and
interrelationship between the relevant international law and the principle of
moderation and restraint. However, by signing on to the OECD consensus,
the United States Government politically committed itself to a substantial part
of the extraterritoriality management approach adopted by the Department of
State following the pipeline crisis. 5 5
52. A footnote to paragraph (ii) states that "[aipplying the principle of comity, as it is
understood in some Member countries, includes following an approach of this nature in exercising
one's jurisdiction." Id. at 25.
53. Id. at 24.
54. Id. at 29-30. Pursuant to this language, Sweden and Denmark gave notice of their South
Africa and Namibia investment laws. See supra note 2. Norway gave notice of proposed legislation
introduced into the Storting in May 1986 [St. meld. nr. 26 (1985-86) and Ot.prp.n.r 34 (1985-86)]
concerning oil exports to South Africa and the registration of Norwegian-owned ships sailing to
South Africa. The notice was vague, however, as to what, if any, extraterritorial ramifications the law
would have. The United States gave notice of: the Export Administration Act of 1985; the Senate
and House versions of the Money Laundering Act of 1986 and the Act as adopted; the South Africa
Sanctions adopted in 1986; and, the Syria sanctions of 1986. The United Kingdom gave notice of its
Outer Space Act, which applies to activities of U.K. nationals without regard to their territorial
location. Secondary offenses under the Act, such as conspiracy, were described as having
extraterritorial implications in keeping with traditional U.K. approaches.
55. See supra p. 290 & note 38.
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The issue remains on the active agenda of the OECD where some Member
State delegations continue to promote theoretical discussions while the
United States continues to emphasize practical approaches and review of
actual experiences. In the present state of affairs, theoretical discussions drive
U.S. representatives to espouse theories which not only encompass all the
extraterritoriality in present U.S. law and practice but also keep open
undefined future options. Focusing the international discussion on practical
approaches and on actual cases is a more promising way of promoting
jurisdictional restraint in fact and developing a body of practice which may
someday support more widely accepted rules.
VII
COMITY AS A JURISDICTIONAL TOOL
Even as the State Department was promoting the process of interest
balancing as international comity, its use as a judicial tool came under
increasing criticism. 5 6 The Justice Department became particularly concerned
that courts might apply an open-ended and undefined interest balancing test
to limit the reach of U.S. statutes on purely political foreign relations
grounds.
Accordingly, the Administration opposed the DeConcini Bill, a proposal to
inject pure and undefined interest balancing into the jurisdictional test
applied by some courts under the antitrust laws. 57 The Administration did,
however, propose a counter to the DeConcini Bill which provided an
exhaustive short list of jurisdictional factors for the court,58 a list suitable to
accommodate the needs of international comity, while not inviting the courts
to engage in purely political interest balancing. Subsequently, the
Administration reached a compromise with Senator DeConcini on a bill with a
more extensive, non-exhaustive list of factors, but which expressly excluded
56. See, e.g., Judge Wilkey's opinion in Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731
F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The author does not believe that Judge Wilkey's dictum in Laker is
properly read as rejecting all judicial interest balancing. The suit involved conduct located
substantially within the United States, concerning which there was little doubt about the intended
reach of U.S. laws. Defendant airline companies of foreign nations, rather than argue principles of
jurisdiction and comity to the United States trial court, instead sought a British injunction.
Defendants asked for a ruling that the U.S. trial judge, in refusing to stop ongoing U.S. court
proceedings so as to allow the United Kingdom to issue an antisuit injunction, abused his discretion
and violated principles of comity. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir.
1976), and Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979), do not stand
for the type of interest balancing which the Laker court declined.
57. See A Bill to Amend the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act to Modify the Application of Such Acts to
International Commerce: Hearings on S. 397 Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1985) (statements of Charles F. Rule, Acting Asst. Attorney General, and Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal
Adviser to the Department of State).
58. Letter from the Attorney General and Secretary of Commerce to the Speaker of the House
(Feb. 19, 1986) (transmitting proposals to amend the Sherman and Clayton Acts, including the
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act of 1986).
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considerations of foreign political relations. 59  This approach is not
substantially different from the approach adopted by Timberlane60 and
Mannington Mills.61
The Administration view that courts should not be invited to engage in
purely political balancing of the interests of the United States and foreign
States is based on its view of constitutional separation of powers. However,
separation of powers does not preclude judicial consideration of traditional
factors such as those listed in the revised DeConcini bill. Nor does it preclude
use of even openly political interest balancing as a basis for the legislative and
executive branches to moderate the reach of U.S. law and enforcement.
Thus, the Administration was able to maintain a clear position in the OECD
that comity, including interest balancing, is appropriate and required in the
political branches of government. "It may not always give a single
unchallengeable answer to complex issues. But it is a valuable guide to the
political solution of problems." 62
VIII
THE RECENT PRACTICE
The United States has insisted with its OECD interlocutors that, if
progress is to be made in managing the extraterritoriality problem, it is more
likely to be made by working and focussing on practical problems rather than
by intergovernmental debate over theory-at least until a substantial body of
helpful practice has been accumulated. There are hopeful signs about the
developing practice.
59. S. 397, in the version reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee in the 99th Congress (to
be reintroduced in the 100th Congress, I st session), would, inter alia, add the following new § 21 (a)
to the Clayton Act of 1914 (15 U.S.C. § 12 (1982)):
Notwithstanding any other provision of the antitrust laws or any provision of any State laws
similar to the antitrust laws, in any action brought by any person or State under the antitrust
laws or similar State laws which involves trade or commerce with a foreign nation, the court shall
enter a judgment dismissing the action as to all parties whenever it determines that the exercise
of jurisdiction would be unreasonable primarily on the basis of the following factors-
(1) the relative significance, to the violation alleged, of conduct within the United States as
compared to conduct abroad;
(2) the nationality of the persons involved in or affected by the conduct;
(3) the presence or absence of a purpose to affect United States consumers or competitors;
(4) the relative significance and foreseeability of the effects of the conduct on the United
States as compared with the effects abroad;
(5) the existence of reasonable expectations that would be furthered or defeated by the
action; and
(6) the degree of conflict with foreign law or articulated foreign economic policies.
Provided, that nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize the court to consider the
effect on the foreign political relations of the United States of any action sought to be dismissed.
S. 397, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
60. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 614-15 (9th Cir. 1976).
61. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297-98 (3d Cir. 1979).
62. Following an Approach of Moderation and Restraint (Sept. 11, 1986) (submission of the
United States before the OECD Working Group on International Investment Policies) (on file with
the Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Economic, Business and Communications).
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In law enforcement, the Department ofJustice moved in 1983 to centralize
in Washington the procedure by which offshore subpoenas are authorized in
criminal cases conducted by its geographically scattered U.S. Attorneys. This
allows more careful consideration of short and long term law enforcement
interests in light of all the relevant factors, including the available alternative
law enforcement avenues. More importantly, the Justice Department, with the
Department of State, is intensively negotiating modern mutual legal
assistance treaties to provide practical cooperative alternatives to unilateral
investigative and evidence gathering actions abroad. 63 The United States has
also reached several new bilateral antitrust arrangements. 64
The Securities Exchange Commission, in 1982, reached a provisional
bilateral agreement with Switzerland for cooperation on insider trading
investigations. 65 Subsequently it sought public comment on a unilateral U.S.
response to foreign bank secrecy, a staff proposal popularly known as "waiver
by conduct,"-66 which provides that persons trading on the U.S. market
through foreign banks and agents would be deemed by U.S. statute to have
waived their rights under foreign law to have those transactions remain secret.
"Waiver by conduct" provoked adverse reaction internationally and has not
been pursued. Had the proposal been adopted, it could have exacerbated
jurisdictional conflict: The relevant foreign authorities would probably not
have agreed that U.S. law effected a waiver, but U.S. courts might have been
required to consider the secrecy right waived. Taking its cue from some of
the foreign comments which invited cooperative approaches rather than such
unilateral measures, the Commission embarked on a multilateral study of the
securities enforcement issues in the OECD, negotiated an endorsement of
multilateral information exchange agreements in the International
63. Currently, the United States has mutual legal assistance treaties ("MLAT") in force with:
Italy, Nov. 13, 1982 (treaty entered into force Nov. 13, 1985), reprinted in S. Doc. No. 25, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1984); the Netherlands, June 12, 1981, T.I.A.S. No. 10734 (entered into force Sept. 15,
1983); Switzerland, May 25, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302 (entered into force Jan. 23,
1977); Turkey, June 7, 1979, 32 U.S.T. 3111, T.I.A.S. No. 9891 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1981).
The United States has ratified an MLAT with: Colombia, Jan. 4, 1982, reprinted in S. EXEC. REP. No.
35, S. TREATY Doc. No. 11, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (not yet in force); Morocco, July 13, 1984,
reprinted in S. EXEC. REP. No. 35, S. TREATY Doc. No. 24, 98th Cong., 2d Sess (1984) (not yet in
force). The United States has signed but not yet ratified MLAT's with: United Kingdom regarding
the Cayman Islands, July 26, 1984; Canada, Mar. 18, 1985, reprinted in 24 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
1092 (1985); and Thailand, Mar. 19, 1986.
64. The United States is party to the following bilateral antitrust agreements: Memorandum of
Understanding as to Notification, Consultation, and Cooperation with Respect to the Application of
National Antitrust Laws, Mar. 9, 1984, United States-Canada reprinted in 23 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
275 (1984); Agreement Relating to Cooperation in Antitrust Matter, June 29, 1982, United States-
Australia, T.I.A.S. No. 10365; Agreement Relating to Mutual Cooperation Regarding Restrictive
Business Practices, June 23, 1976, United States-Federal Republic of Germany, 27 U.S.T. 1956,
T.I.A.S. No. 8291.
65. On Aug. 31, 1982, the United States and Switzerland signed a Memorandum of
Understanding to establish mutually acceptable means for dealing with the problems of inside
trading. See Greene, U.S., Switzerland Agree to Prosecute Insider Traders, Legal Times, Oct. 4, 1982, at 12.
66. Request for comments concerning a concept to improve the commission's ability to
investigate and prosecute persons who purchase or sell securities in the U.S. markets from other
countries, Exchange Act Release No. 21,186 [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
1 83,648 (July 30, 1984).
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Organization of Securities Commissions, 67 and began a bilateral securities law
enforcement agreement program. 68 The cooperative approach paid large
dividends when an ad hoc cooperative arrangement with the Bahamas was
instrumental in the Levine insider trading case and led to the Boesky case.
Despite these successes, differences of discovery and investigative
philosophy still raise difficulties for law enforcement. Agreed and practical
channels of evidence gathering and other cooperation remain unavailable for
much important law enforcement activity, particularly for conduct which is
not criminal in the foreign state. There is concern abroad that the United
States is too hesitant to commit fully to trying agreed channels before
resorting to unilateral methods. Concern has been expressed about
legislation providing the Federal Trade Commission and the Commodities
Futures Trading Commission with authority to serve subpoenas overseas, 69
an authority not widely held within the United States Government and almost
never used in light of the sensitivity of foreign judicial sovereignty.
In the field of economic sanctions, the recent Nicaragua, Libya, and Iran
programs are precedents noteworthy for jurisdictional restraint. While the
executive orders and regulations are subject to change, the Nicaragua
sanctions are limited essentially to direct trade between the territory of the
United States and Nicaragua. 70 The Libya sanctions were also originally
limited to direct trade and have since been only slightly extended. 7' For the
purposes of the Libya sanctions, U.S. persons have not at present been
defined to include foreign subsidiaries of companies incorporated in the
United States. The Libyan asset freeze order, while applying to foreign
67. Passed by the Organization on Nov. 7, 1986.
68. In addition to including securities provisions in the Cayman Islands and Canadian MLAT's,
supra note 63, the SEC has entered into bilateral cooperative arrangements with: United Kingdom,
Sept. 23, 1986; Japan, May 23, 1986; Ontario, Sept. 20, 1985; Quebec, Nov. 1, 1984. Other
arrangements are pending (all securities cooperation arrangements are on file with the Division of
Enforcement, Securities Exchange Commission).
69. The government of the United Kingdom protested the new authorization for the Federal
Trade Commission to serve civil investigative demands outside the United States, contained in the
Federal Trade Commission Act Amendments of 1985, S. 1078 (99th Congress). The United
Kingdom and Switzerland have each protested somewhat similar provisions for service of
administrative subpoenas by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, S. 2045 and H.R. 4613
(99th Cong.).
70. Exec. Order No. 12,513, 3 C.F.R. § 342 (1985); Nicaraguan Trade Control Regulations, 31
C.F.R. § 540.204-05 (1985).
71. Exec. Order No. 12,543, 3 C.F.R. § 181 (1986). As originally issued, Treasury regulations
implementing the trade ban did not reach exports to third countries for re-export to Libya where the
goods were incorporated into manufactured products, substantially transformed, or come to rest in
the third country for purposes other than re-shipment to Libya. This was later modified slightly to
prohibit exports of goods to third countries where the exporter knows or has reason to know that the
exported goods are intended specifically for substantial transformation or incorporation abroad into
manufactured products to be used in the Libyan petroleum or petrochemical industry. A similar
prohibition was added for exports of technical data. See 31 C.F.R. § 550.409 (1986). Unlike the
Commerce Department, export controls previously adopted regarding Libya, which remain in force,
see 15 C.F.R. § 385.7 (1985), the new provisions apply only to the U.S. exporter, not the foreign re-
exporter.
THE U.S. GOVERNMENT APPROACH
branches of U.S. banks, is limited abroad to dollar denominated deposits72
and, due to widely shared opposition to Libyan sponsorship of terrorism, has
provoked no diplomatic protest from such jurisdictionally neuralgic nations as
Great Britain. 73 The British government instead considered it a matter for
the civil courts which, in September, 1987, awarded the Libyan Arab Foreign
Bank a judgment against Bankers Trust in London for payment of its dollar
accounts.74 The Treasury Department subsequently licensed payment of that
judgment without first requiring Bankers Trust to carry through an appeal. 75
The ban on Iranian imports adopted in 1987 does not reach Iranian crude oil
refined in third countries or other Iranian products substantially transformed
or incorporated into manufactured products in third countries. 76
As noted above, the desire to avoid the problems of extraterritoriality has
not been sufficient to modify the traditional re-export control pattern used
under the Export Administration Act for South Africa 77 and Syria 78 sanctions.
In the case of South Africa, Congress codified computer controls with re-
export reach. However, in implementing the Congressional mandate for
controls on the export of U.S. oil to South Africa, the Department of
Commerce has avoided reaching re-exports of that oil from outside the
United States by noncitizens, including foreign subsidiaries of U.S.
companies .79
In the operation of the export controls more generally, the United States is
working with a number of countries to develop strategic commodity export
control systems parallel to those of the sixteen nations belonging to the
Coordinating Committee on strategic exports (COCOM).80 Such measures
reduce the need for unilateral U.S. action in conflict with the law and policy of
those countries. The United States has taken diplomatic steps to avoid
72. Exec. Order No. 12,544, 3 C.F.R. § 183 (1986); Libyan Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R.
§ 550.516 (1986).
73. Sir Michael Havers, British Attorney-General, in a speech noted with appreciation the
limitation of the United States freeze overseas to dollar accounts in branches of United States banks,
but was careful not to endorse the freeze as fully meeting United Kingdom extraterritoriality
concerns. He also stated: "We understand and sympathize with the reasons behind the United
States' blocking of Libyan assets and, as a matter of public policy, we will not object to this particular
measure and will not undermine it." M. Havers, Address to the ABA Section of International Law
and Practice (June 30, 1986).
74. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust, High Ct., London, Sept. 2, 1987.
75. Marcan & Gutfeld, U.S. Allows Bankers Trust to Repay Libya $292 Million, Wall St. J., Oct. 13,
1987, at 17, col. 1.
76. Exec. Order No. 12,613, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,940 (1987); 31 C.F.R. §§ 560.201(b), .407(a)
(1987).
77. See Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, § 304, 100 Stat. 1086,
1099 (codified at 22 U.S.C.A. § 5054 (West Supp. 1985)).
78. See, e.g., 15 C.F.R. § 385.4(d) (1987).
79. 52 Fed. Reg. 2,105 (1987).
80. The Administration's efforts in this regard follow express Congressional policy. Section
3(3) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended, states that
[i]t is the policy of the United States (A) to apply any necessary controls to the maximum extent
possible in cooperation with all nations, and (B) to encourage observance of a uniform export
control policy by all nations with which the United States has defense treaty commitments or
common strategic objectives.
50 U.S.C. § 2402(3) (Supp. III 1985).
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conflict with other governments over the overseas audits required by the new
export "distribution license" program81 The Commerce Department
recently took a small step toward meeting the basic foreign government
concern that manufacture or substantial transformation in their countries is
essentially their economic activity and not subject to continuing U.S. controls
because of U.S.-origin components. It established a de minimis threshold
(generally twenty-five percent of content; for some countries ten percent and
$10,000) below which U.S.-origin content in foreign products would not be
subject to continued U.S. export controls.8 2 While this change should reduce
the range of conflicts, it is probably not enough to end the damage to U.S.
companies' supplier relationships with foreign manufacturers. A test of above
fifty percent by value of the finished product, while not meeting all the
theoretical objections to U.S. controls, might meet this need and avoid further
damaging diplomatic conflict.
The United States has also taken some novel steps recently to limit and
shape the extraterritorial reach of U.S. legislation. The space launch
legislation was carefully shaped both to meet our potential obligations for
satellites launched by our citizens from abroad and to respect the
jurisdictional prerogatives of the launching state.8 3 In the more difficult area
of money laundering, the executive branch introduced legislation which had
substantially less potential for extraterritoriality conflict than money
laundering legislation introduced by others.8 4 The bill which ultimately
passed is fairly limited in its reach, and the Administration has moved to meet
some of the foreign concerns about its implementation.8 5 Regarding
antitrust, the Administration has, as noted above, supported reform on the
foreign commerce jurisdiction issue, calling not for naked interest balancing
but for weighing a number of factors in determining when U.S. antitrust law
will apply to a situation with international aspects.8 6 The Administration has
also proposed to reform the internationally troubling antitrust remedies8 7 and
has interceded amicus curiae to urge Supreme Court approval of the foreign
sovereign compulsion defense.88 The United States has also moved by
81. Companies holding "distribution licenses" avoid the burden of obtaining transaction-by-
transaction export licenses. However, to remain eligible, both distribution license holders and their
foreign consignees must establish internal systems, which are subject to audit, to protect against
diversions. 15 C.F.R. § 373.3 (1986). The prospect of U.S. officials auditing firms located abroad
had originally produced criticism from foreign governments. See, e.g., Diplomatic Note, Delegation
of the Commission of the European Communities (Nov. 7, 1985) (on file with the Office of the Legal
Adviser, State Dep't).
82. 15 C.F.R. § 376.12 (1986).
83. The Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, 49 U.S.C.A. § 2605(a)(3)(B) (West Supp.
1987).
84. H.R. 2785, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
85. See supra note 26.
86. See supra notes 58, 59.
87. Letter, supra note 58.
88. Brief for the United States as amicus curiae supporting petitioners, Matsushita Elect. Indust.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (No. 83-2004). The Supreme Court, however, held
for petitioners without reaching the issue. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
[Vol. 50: No. 3
THE U.S. GOVERNMENT APPROACH
"jawboning," participating in several court cases, and legislating to bring a




The basic thesis of the United States in the debate over the management of
the extraterritoriality problem can be simply summarized. Important national
interests increasingly require the exercise of jurisdiction over conduct not
neatly contained within one nation's borders. Such exercise of jurisdiction is
not barred by current rules of international law, under which there is a
substantial area of legitimate concurrent jurisdiction and potential for
conflicting assertions of law and policy. The effort to eliminate
extraterritoriality problems by asserting specific binding jurisdictional legal
rules may be counterproductive. Automatic territorial priority is not an
adequate solution. While territory is jurisdictionally important, the basic
requirements and vital interests of nations do not always balance in
accordance with the territorial connections. Comity is the conceptual tool for
managing potential conflict in the area where law does not provide an
exclusive jurisdiction. Comity in this context involves the exercise of
moderation and restraint by all parties to a potential conflict. To make it
work, there must be a responsive and cooperative international approach,
such as law enforcement assistance arrangements, accommodating the basic
national requirements of the parties.
There is reason for cautious optimism. The current level of conscious U.S.
government dedication to managing and avoiding conflict over
extraterritoriality is relatively high. In this atmosphere, practical cooperative
arrangements are progressively reducing the potential for law enforcement
conflict. U.S. and foreign counterpart agencies are becoming increasingly
aware of what they need to do to work together successfully. Policy makers, at
a high level, are factoring extraterritoriality concerns into the early stages of
decisionmaking on foreign policy controls and sanctions. The staff level of
many agencies has become familiar with the concerns and the management
policy.
Substantial prodding from concerned allies, trading partners, the
American bar, and the business community has helped develop the
89. In 1986, the Administration recommended legislation that would limit the use of worldwide
unitary taxation by the states. See S. 1974, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1986). Additionally, the United
States has appeared as amicus curiae in Alcan Aluminum v. Franchise Tax Bd., No. 84-C-6932 (N.D.
Ill. 1984), and Barclay's Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd., No. 325061 (Super. Ct. Sacramento City, Cal.
1984) arguing that worldwide unitary tax is unconstitutional. On Jan. 30, 1986, Secretary Shultz sent
a letter to the governors of the states still using the method. A California law granting companies an
option out of the worldwide unitary tax method, signed by Governor Deukmajian on Sept. 5, 1986,
has substantially reduced the problem, although California's imposition of a substantial fee for the
option of avoiding the unitary tax continues to raise questions. Economic Development Act. ch. 660,
art. 12, 1986 Cal. Legis. Serv. 381, 391-404 (West) (codified at REV. & TAX CODE § 16429.30).
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government's current awareness of the importance of international comity
and jurisdictional restraint for a workable, cooperative international system.
There is, however, only a small political constituency in the United States
advocating something so esoteric as this. The pressures on a government
agency to subordinate comity to other interests are enormous. Crisis political
pressures may also short circuit the most careful extraterritoriality
management strategies. Furthermore, progress depends to a large degree
upon advance consultation by other U.S. agencies with the State Department
and, in some cases, foreign governments, which runs counter to deeply
ingrained bureaucratic tendencies.
Accordingly, while recent experience shows some progress, those
concerned with extraterritoriality must remain vigilant. There are sure to be
skirmishes and battles ahead.
